ABSTRACT With the penetration of real-time Ethernet in industry, the mechanism of CANopen protocol based on real-time Ethernet (COE) has been widely used in various distributed control systems. However, due to some defects of the existing COE mechanism, the functional integrity and security for communication could not be guaranteed. Thus, Safe-COE architecture is designed in this paper. First, safe communication problems in systems are analyzed. Then, based on the Security and Safety Modeling (SESAMO) method, safe building blocks for communication are designed and combining these building blocks with Safe-COE mechanism, a kind of Safe-COE communication architecture is proposed. Finally, communication performance is tested based on this architecture. The results show that based on the general Ethernet MII bus interface, the minimum communication cycle could reach 125 µs, and the minimum synchronization accuracy of peripherals control could be about 100 ns. Moreover, the formal modeling method is used to verify the safe integrity of this architecture. The results show that the architecture could meet related safe requirements of attack protection, data validation, disconnect monitoring, and state switching. Currently, there is no safe communication architecture for a distributed control system that could fully meet related standards and consider both functional safety and information security. It could provide a theoretical basis and solution for safe communication in the distributed control system. INDEX TERMS COE communication protocol, distributed control system, formalized modeling method, real-time Ethernet bus, SESAMO building blocks.
avionics, transportation, and industrial control. This approach could provide constructive elements for real-time safe system deployment and provide a comprehensive analysis procedure for security and safety. And, it could analyze the relationship between security and safety mechanisms for these elements and enhance their deployment and implementation. Because system communication also needs to face these two safe aspects of problems, so this method is applied in this paper.
For system or functional modules, safe integration design refers to the design of the complete safe state machine based on functional attributes and safe requirements of system, so as to ensure that the system could switch into the preset stable state under safe risk. For testing and verification for safe state machine integrity of system, formalized modeling method [13] is undoubtedly a kind of effective verification method. It is not limited by the limited sets of tests and could traverse all logical situations. And, it could be used to verify the safe constraints that the system needs to meet and some safe properties [14] - [16] . This method could significantly reduce the works for artificial abstraction and code refactoring. However, other methods are difficult to analyze and verify the safe integrity of the system as a whole. In SESAMO, formal modeling could be used for formal safe analysis of communication and formal analysis of information flow in this paper.
This paper firstly analyzes the key factors that affect the safe communication from two aspects of functional safety and information security. Then, combined with SESAMO method, the building blocks for safe communication are designed, and the Safe-COE communication mechanism based on real-time Ethernet is proposed. And, based on this mechanism, the safe communication architecture of system is designed, and the actual system is established. Finally, for this safe architecture, the effect on communication performance is tested and formalized modeling method is used to its safe validation.
II. SAFE ANALYSIS OF REAL-TIME ETHERNET DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM A. SAFE ISSUES IN DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM
Generally, as shown in Figure 1 , distributed control system based on real-time Ethernet mainly consists of the following parts, including: master, real-time Ethernet bus, slaves and HMI device. And the line-type is the most representative topology for real-time Ethernet bus [17] , [18] .
The functional blocks diagram for each module of the system is shown in Figure 2 [19] , [20] . For distributed control system, the safe problems are mainly divided into the following parts: (1) safe communication problems between HMI device and master; (2) safe problems of programming organization unit(POU) in master; (3) master's fault diagnosis and redundant safety problems; (4) safe control problems of system actuator; (5) communication security and safety problems based on real time Ethernet. Due to important significance of the safe communication based on real time Ethernet, the purpose of this paper is to analyze safe communication problems between master and slaves from two aspects of functional safety and information security and to propose the complete safe architecture.
B. KEY FACTORS FOR SAFE COMMUNICATION BASED ON REAL-TIME ETHERNET
The main objects of the real-time Ethernet communication include master and all slaves. The safe issues that the communication part might encounter are shown in Figure 3 . The details are as follows. 1) The issues of functional safety in master x Network communication interruption. Due to the failure of the bus link connection or master network port, master may not be able to communicate with all slaves normally. Once master is unable to communicate with slaves, and the whole system must be out of control. The master needs to provide relevant error feedbacks for user through HMI device.
y Slave data receiving error. During the normal operation, the problems of error code may occur due to the unstable connection or operation of the hardware. In this case, although the communication link is not broken, master receives the error data and thus it could not properly reflect the status of each slave to the HMI device.
z Incomplete communication protocol stack. According to the standard, because the protocol stack has the ability to deal with common failures in the industry, it is particularly important to have a complete communication protocol stack that conforms to the standard.
2) The issues of information security in master { Communication exceptional frames. During one communication cycle, the number and type of communication frames on bus of system are known. When communication is attacked externally, other unknown communication frames may exist on bus. Therefore, by monitoring and processing network abnormal frames, it could effectively prevent the attack of external threats on system.
| External threats attack on the communication port. External threats may intercept data from the communication port or communication link and the relevant communication protocols are obtained. When the attackers get the communication protocol, they could make use of illegal device to realize the control of all slaves in system.
3) The issues of functional safety in slave } Network communication interruption. Communication between slaves and master may be interrupted due to the failure of bus controller or connection of slaves. Although the communication interruption problems of master and slave belong to the same kind of problems, because of different position of master and slave, their treatments for this kind of problems are different. When communication in slave is interrupted, it is necessary to consider putting the peripherals in safe state.
Bus data receiving error. Abnormal port or unstable connection may lead to data receiving error. It is difficult to guarantee the safe control for slaves to operate peripherals by using wrong data. On the one hand, slave needs to keep the peripherals in safe state; on the other hand, it needs to feed back the fault to master.
Incomplete communication protocol stack. The main function of communication stack is to control the communication behaviors for local slave. Some failures could put the protocol stack in an exception-handling state. But, many common failures cannot be addressed if the protocol stack is incomplete.
4) The issues of information security in slave External attack on the bus controller. External threats may steal data through bus controllers or communication links. After data is obtained by illegal ways, attackers could operate the relevant peripherals of slaves directly, so that the slave is detached from the system platform and operated illegally by attackers.
To sum up, this section analyzes the safe communication problems at all layers of system from the perspectives of functional safety and information security. In terms of functional safety, it mainly includes network interruption, data receiving error and communication protocol stack failure. In terms of information security, it includes external attack on network port or bus and the exceptional frames. In order to prevent these safe problems from affecting the normal communication, based on the SESAMO, a kind of safe communication architecture is proposed in this paper. Under the premise of satisfying related standards, the architecture could consider the safe problems above comprehensively without affecting the communication performance.
III. SAFETY AND SECURITY INTEGRATED DESIGN OF SYSTEM COMMUNICATION A. THE SYSTEM DESIGN COMBINING SESAMO METHOD AND FORMALIZED MODELING
Based on IEC61508 [21] , [22] , ISO26262 [23] , [24] and IEC62443 [25] , [26] standards, SESAMO method could be used to design the safe architecture of network embedded system for functional security and information security. And, the formal modeling method could be used for modeling, simulation and verification of architecture. Combined with these two methods, a complete architecture of safe integration design and verification could be formed. Based on V-model [27] , Figure 4 is the design process combining SESAMO method with formalized modeling. As shown in the figure, the process of this method mainly includes concept of operation, system design, safe integration, system development, formalized modeling and validation. The details are as follows.
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
During concept of operation, the safe requirements for communication need to be summarized, which are the foundation of technical safe requirements and elaborated design. 
C. SYSTEM DESIGN
During system design phase in SESAMO, the corresponding technical requirements would be proposed according to actual safe requirements. Combined with these technical requirements, the safe constructive elements of the system need to be designed. In their design process, it is necessary to analyze and reduce the dependencies of safety and security. Finally, related safe building blocks are created for safe integrated design of system. The format of the SESAMO building blocks is defined as shown in Table 1 . In this section, the safety and security building blocks used for the Safe-COE architecture are elaborated, including the building blocks of node authentication, communication encryption, checksum, communication interruption monitoring and network frames monitoring. And, combining with these building blocks and Safe-COE mechanism, the Safe-COE communication architecture is constructed.
1) NODE AUTHENTICATION
During initialization of system, in the terms of information security, node authentication is an effective method to prevent external intrusion for the issue | and in part B of section II. By mutual confirmation between master and slaves, illegal devices could be prevented from statically connecting to the system. The node authentication building block in this system is described as follows:
By this bidirectional static authentication mechanism, the authentication between master and slaves during system initialization could be ensured.
2) COMMUNICATION ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
During normal communication, in the terms of information security, communication encryption could prevent illegal data theft and illegal control of the system by external devices for the problem | and in part B of section II. For real-time systems, the selection of encryption algorithm is particularly important because of the large amount of its computation. It needs to consider not only the encryption degree of the algorithm, but also whether the algorithm would affect the real-time performance. The communication encryption/decryption building block is described as follows:
For problem y and~in part B of section II, data verification is an effective method to detect errors in data transmission. In terms of functional safety, it prevents the system from controlling with faulty communication data. The checksum building block for communication in system is described below:
CRC8 checksum is used for the calibration of communication data, which could reduce error rate of communication data with a small amount of calculation.
4) COMMUNICATION INTERRUPTION MONITORING
For problem x and }, in the terms of functional safety, system has the risk of communication link disconnection or abnormality. The abnormal communication could affect the safety of the system and peripherals. However, the failure phenomenon of communication link interruption is usually communication timeout, so it is necessary to add a timeout monitoring mechanism in master and slaves. The details are as follow.
5) NETWORK FRAMES MONITORING
For real time Ethernet with linear or ring topology, communication frames are all sent by master. And network frames return to master after passing through all slaves. Therefore, for the problem {, the mechanism of network frame monitoring in master could prevent illegal devices from accessing the bus. If there is an illegal device on bus to send data to slaves, it would eventually be acquired by master. The following is the description of this building block.
6) THE SAFE-COE COMMUNICATION MECHANISM
The Safe-COE communication mechanism is designed in this section due to the defects of existing COE mechanism. Compared to them, on one hand, this mechanism contains all objects of CANopen protocol with complete functions. On the other hand, it provides the communication carrier for the introduction of safe mechanisms.
As shown in Figure 6 below, the network frame of bus includes network frame header, bus frame header, bus datagram and the FCS communication verification area. Object), SDO (Server Data Object), SYNC (synchronization object) and PDO (Process Data Object). After CANopen data is transformed into 11 bytes of data in application layer, it is encrypted by Blowfish and stored in the Ethernet frame. Data-len denotes the actual data byte length of CAN frame (0 ≤ Data − len ≤ 8).
One group of PDO contains one TPDO (Transmit-PDO) and one RPDO (Receive-PDO). Because the different types of slaves have different number of PDO's groups, so the length of slave's data segments in the mapping datagrams need to be set according to the maximal number of PDO's groups in slaves. The system has several types of slaves below: digital I/O slave, analog I/O slave and motion control slave. And the bytes length of their data segments is 16, 24 and 48 respectively. At the end of data segment of each slave, one-byte of area for checksum needs to be added.
In addition, because CANopen protocol runs on the real-time Ethernet network, so for the problem z and , it is necessary to extend the fault processing range of CANopen protocol stack in application layer and fully consider the fault problems above faced by real-time Ethernet communication.
D. SAFE INTEGRATION OF SYSTEM
Combined with these safe building blocks in part C of section III, based on the Safe-COE communication mechanism, the Safe-COE architecture for real-time Ethernet distributed control system is designed. The Safe-COE communication architecture is shown in the Figure 7 below in detail. The black arrow denotes the main communication flow. The red arrow represents the fault feedback route. The green arrow and the light blue arrow represent the routes of authentication of slave and master respectively.
In this safe architecture, node authentication module mainly ensures the identity legitimacy of master and slave during initialization. In the event of failures, the communication link could not be established. The communication checksum and the communication encryption building blocks are located on the main communication flow. Each communication cycle needs to encrypt, verify and deal with the communication data. And, communication interrupt monitoring and network frame monitoring building blocks adopt multithread mechanism to realize the safe monitoring of the communication without affecting the main communication flow. Once the above building blocks detect failures, they would immediately feedback the failure to the CANopen protocol stack for achieving the safe state switch. During system initialization, system performs authentication of master and slaves and related communication initialization. After the initialization, the system executes normal communication. Figure 8 and Figure 9 are the complete data flow diagrams during initialization and normal communication respectively. The details are as follows. The identity information of master and slave is agreed in advance and confidential. As shown in Figure 8 , all slaves authenticate to master firstly. Master sends the identity information to the relevant registers of bus controllers in slaves according to the order of slaves. After receiving these characters of the identity information, the micro-processor unit(MPU) of this slave compares the characters with the correct information in turn. If all characters are matched successfully, the master is authenticated successfully in this slave. And the slave allows master to initialize it. If the master's authentication fails, error message is returned to master and subsequent tasks are terminated.
After master's authentication finished, master begins to authenticate all slaves. Master obtains the identity information of each slave in relevant registers of bus controller through bus communication. After the identity information of all slaves is confirmed to be correct, master begins to the initialization of communication for each slave and assigns related data channels. For the non-communication interrupt faults, when the faults are detected in master, the state of CANopen protocol stack of master is switched to stop state and the faults are uploaded. According to CANopen protocol, after master has entered into stop state, some commands are sent to slaves to put their protocol stacks in stop state. So the safety of related peripherals is ensured. When faults are detected by slaves, slaves put the fault information into the status word of RPDO and control the related peripherals of slaves in safe state directly. In addition, communication interrupt faults are handled according to the mechanism of communication interruption monitoring.
To sum up, based on the Safe-COE communication mechanism, these safe building blocks are deeply integrated with the standard CANopen protocol. And, a complete Safe-COE communication architecture for distributed control system is formed. This safe communication architecture takes CANopen standard protocol as the core and combines with safe building blocks to realize safe communication. It could guarantee the safety and security of communication under distributed system architecture.
IV. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION
A. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT In this system, master is the central module based on ATOM-E3845 processor. And, slave is an embedded module based on ARM chip. Moreover, based on the general Ethernet MII interface, the real-time Ethernet bus of this system is self-developed and it is the variant of IEEE1588 standard [32] . As shown in Figure 10 , the distributed control system based on Safe-COE communication architecture is constructed in this paper.
System validation mainly includes communication performance test and safe validation. The purpose is to verify that the safe architecture could meet safe requirements of the system without affecting the communication performance. 
B. COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE TEST
Because this safe architecture applied in distributed control system needs to meet the requirements of real-time and synchronization, this part mainly includes the time-consuming test of CRC8 algorithm and Blowfish algorithm, real-time test of communication and synchronization test of system. As shown in Figure 11 , the value of each point is the average of 200 experiments. Because the processing capacity of master is better than that of slaves, the running time of these algorithms in slaves is longer than that in master. For the CRC8 algorithm, its impact on real-time performance could be ignored. For Blowfish encryption algorithm, its time consumption would be a few larger because the encryption process involves reduplicative cyclic bits operation and two-dimensional arrays transformation, but it would not have a great impact on the real-time performance.
As mentioned in part C of section III, the data length of each type slave is 16, 24 and 48 bytes respectively. And as shown in Figure 11 , in master, the data encryption of these lengths needs about 3.3 µs, 4.8 µs and 9.1 µs respectively, while slave needs 6.2 µs, 8.7 µs and 17.8 µs respectively. Therefore, the relationship between the communication cycle T and the number of slaves of each type is as follow (Unit: µs). In here, N D , N A and N E denote the numbers of digital I/O slave, analog I/O slave and motion control slave in system. T c denotes the communication cycle without these safe algorithms.
For testing of the minimum communication cycle and the synchronization deviation, three slaves are connected into system. As shown in Figure 12 , according to this test, the minimum communication cycle of this system could be 125us and the synchronization deviation of peripherals control could reach 100ns. To sum up, According to the test, in terms of real-time communication, the calculation amount generated by CRC8 could be ignored. Therefore, this architecture would not affect the real-time communication in terms of safety. However, the use of Blowfish algorithm needs to increase the time of communication cycle, but the increase is a little, so this architecture has little impact on the real-time communication in terms of security. In addition, this safe architecture has no effect on the system synchronization performance. 
C. SAFETY AND SECURITY VALIDATION
For safety and security validation of architecture, the main purpose is to verify whether system could meet relevant safe constraints and could achieve safe state switching during failure. It does not need quantitative analysis of the probability of faults. Therefore, modeling and validation of safe architecture using time automata is the most effective method. In addition, because the UPPAAL tool could conduct state traversal for the formalized model and is convenient to analyze the safe constraints satisfied by the model, this paper uses UPPAAL to model and analyze this safe architecture. The details are as follows.
1) SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE
During system initialization, the time automata models of master, slaves and bus are respectively shown in (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 13 . For the convenience of illustration, only one slave is connected in the system. This part mainly implements state machine model of authentication of master and slaves during initialization. Figure 14 is the state flow of successful and failed authentication of master and slaves simulated by the simulator in UPPAAL. In here, P1, P2 and P3 are respectively the instantiation objects of master, slave and bus. The UPPAAL validator is used to verify the following properties, as shown in Table 7 .
As shown in Table 7 , five properties of the model, including deadlock, states reachability and the logic correctness of safety and security mechanisms, are mainly verified during initialization. In addition, in Table 7 and subsequent Table 8 , ''Safety'' refers to a kind of model attribute type for formal verification, which has a different meaning from ''Safety'' in the rest of the paper.
To sum up, by the verification of the above properties of the model by the validator, the time automata model of this architecture could meet the related safe design requirements during initialization.
2) NORMAL COMMUNICATION PHASE
Similarly, during communication, the time automata models of master, slaves and bus are respectively shown in (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 15 . For the convenience of illustration, only one slave is connected in system. Figure 16 is the state flows of success and failure of communication in master and slaves simulated by the simulator in UPPAAL. In here, P1, P2 and P3 are respectively the instantiation models of master, slave and bus.
The UPPAAL validator is used to verify the following properties, as shown in Table 8 .
As shown in table 8, during communication, eleven properties of the model are mainly verified, including deadlock, state switching in case of failure and relevant logic properties for safety and security.
In the phase of normal communication, by the verification of the above properties of the model by the validator, it indicates this architecture could meet related safe design requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the safe communication of distributed control system is deeply researched. The conclusions are as follows:
1) According to the classification of functional safety and information security, the key factors affecting safe communication of system are analyzed. And aiming at these factors, based on SESAMO method, safe building blocks for distributed control system are designed and their impacts and dependencies on safety and security are obtained. These blocks could ensure the safe communication of the system in the aspects of attack protection, data validation, disconnect monitoring and state switching. They could provide component support for safe integration design of communication in system.
2) A kind of Safe-COE communication architecture is proposed and applied to the actual system successfully. Based on the complete CANopen protocol, this architecture adds safe mechanisms such as data verification, communication encryption, disconnect monitoring and data anomaly monitoring. While ensuring the standardization, synchronization and real-time performance, the system communication has been further improved in functional safety and information security.
3) The impact of relevant algorithms on real-time performance in the Safe-COE architecture is tested and the formalized model of this architecture is constructed. It shows that, based on the general Ethernet MII interface, the minimum communication cycle could reach 125us and the minimum synchronization accuracy of peripherals control could be about 100ns based on this architecture. And the formalized validation shows that this architecture could meet relevant safe requirements without affecting real-time performance. So, it has theoretical and engineering significance for improving the safety and security of communication in distributed control system in the future. 
